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THE S&L DEBACLE
LAWRENCE J. WHITE*
TtE savings-and-loan ("S&L") debacle is in many ways an awful
story-awful in both senses of that word. But it is a story that has
not been well reported in the press or media, because the media focus is
on anecdotes and personalities. All you have to do is look at the front
page of the Wall Street Journal to get yet another version of the personal-
ities and the anecdotes and to see the media focus on the ephemeral
rather than the fundamentals. What I want to do here is to tell the story
of what happened, why it happened, how it happened, and what must be
done so that it never happens again.
The story is one of government failing, of our government failing. It is
a story of greed, and of neglect; it is a story of corruption in high places;
it is a story of the end of a number of political careers. I am not, how-
ever, going to address any of that. You can get that from the Wall Street
Journal. I am going to examine something for the moment that is much
more important, and, to me, considerably more exciting-accounting.
Now, I say the word accounting and people start looking at their
watches. Please, stay with me. I hope I can convince you that an under-
standing of some very simple accounting concepts can provide a great
deal of insight into what happened, why it happened, and how it hap-
pened. I begin with a simple illustration.
Assets Liabilities
$100 (loans) $92 (insured deposits)
$8 (net worth)
Figure 1. Balance Sheet of a Healthy Thrift as of
December 31, 198X.
I start out in Figure 1 with a very simple balance sheet for a S&L (a
"thrift"), but it would apply equally forcefully to any commercial bank
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in the land. The assets of that thrift or bank are the loans that it makes.
That may be somewhat counter-intuitive, but from the perspective of the
bank or the thrift, the loans that it makes are investments, and thus
assets.
The primary liabilities of a bank or a thrift are its deposits. Again,
that may seem counter-intuitive, but it owes that money to the deposi-
tors. I am going to assume that all of those deposits are insured. For the
S&L industry that is in fact a very good assumption. For commercial
banking it is at least a reasonable assumption. If we subtract the liabili-
ties from the assets, and the liabilities are less than the assets, there is
something left over. That something left over is called capital in the
banking world. The rest of the business world calls it net worth. It is
just a simple subtraction of the value of the liabilities from the value of
the assets. In essence, it is the owners' stake in this enterprise. You
could think of it as the liquidation value of the enterprise: net worth is
just the simple residual of the owners' stake. Notice that I have made an
important assumption that these numbers represent true market values.
That is an extremely important assumption, one to which we shall return
later.
If these are true market values, the net worth of eight dollars is the
true market value net worth. The media has done a dreadful job in re-
porting this net worth or capital figure. They refer to it as cash, or cash
on hand, or cash capital, but it is nothing of the sort. It is simply an
arithmetic residual of the difference between the value of the assets and
the value of the liabilities.
Assets Liabilities
$92 (loans) $92 (insured deposits)
$0 (net worth)
Figure 2. Balance Sheet of a Marginal Thrift as of
December 31, 198Y.
Figure 2 represents a thrift in which the value of the assets has de-
clined from one hundred to ninety-two dollars because some of the bor-
rowers cannot pay their loans back or can only pay them back on
extended terms at lower interest rates. The value of those loans has gone
down.
Assets Liabilities
$60 (loans) $92 (insured deposits)
-$32 (net worth)
Figure 3. Balance Sheet of a Marginal Thrift as of
December 31, 198Z.
Figure 3 represents the S&L that I saw all too often and that we con-
tinue to see all too often, one that has assets worth only sixty dollars, but
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where deposit liabilities equal ninety-two dollars. By a simple arithmetic
process we have negative thirty-two dollars of net worth.
Even this modest amount of accounting offers some important in-
sights. First, banks and S&Ls, even healthy ones, are very thinly capital-
ized. Stated another way, they are very highly leveraged.
There are two ways of measuring capitalization or leverage. One is to
relate the debt of an institution, essentially the deposits for a bank, to its
net worth. For example, a typical manufacturing company in this coun-
try has a debt to net worth ratio of one to one or two to one. In a lever-
aged buyout, we are typically talking about a ratio of five to one or six to
one. Here, however, we have a healthy bank or S&L with a ratio of 11.5
to one.
In terms of net worth to assets, the manufacturing company in the
above example would have a fifty percent net worth to assets ratio,
whereas this healthy bank or thrift has only an eight percent net worth to
assets ratio. If you own an enterprise like this, the attractiveness of lever-
age is that a small positive percentage change in the value of the assets
leads to a large positive percentage change in the value of the net worth.
For example, in Figure 1, a four percent gain in assets-from $100 to
$104-would lead to an increase in net worth to twelve dollars. Thus, a
four percent change in assets leads to a fifty percent change in the own-
ers' stake in the enterprise.
We must also remember that we operate in a legal economic environ-
ment of limited liability. The owners' liability for the costs of this enter-
prise is limited to their stake in it. Except for exceptional circumstances
like criminal activity or failure to meet fiduciary obligations, the owners'
liability ends once their initial investment is gone. If there are inadequate
assets to cover the obligations to the depositors, that becomes somebody
else's problem. Thus, the owners' incentives are rather different than if
they were completely liable for all of the shortfalls. In this limited liabil-
ity world, owners want to take more risks. They get all of the upside of
taking risks, but are exposed to only a limited amount of the downside.
That limited amount is their initial contribution.
In addition, the owners of a bank or thrift would like to operate with
as little net worth as possible because the less net worth they have in-
vested, the less they have at risk and the more they can say, "heads I win,
tails it is somebody else's problem."
The rest of the economic world came to understand this basic para-
digm long ago. The debt holders in a manufacturing company under-
stand these problems. If they hold the bonds of such a company, they
typically put covenants in their bond indentures that limit the activities
of the owners or of the managers of the company operating on the own-
ers' behalf. If a bank makes a loan to a corporation, it puts restrictions in
its lending agreement to ensure that nothing will happen that could put it
at risk. Thus, the rest of the world understands risk analysis. And, to a
limited extent, the bank regulators do too. Many of the safety and
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soundness regulations in the banking area can be seen as the equivalent
of the bond holders' covenant.
The bank regulator has several tools available to restrain action. The
tools can be divided into two primary categories: (1) direct restrictions
on an activity that the bank or thrift takes; and (2) the requirement that a
bank or thrift maintain a minimum level of net worth. Net worth repre-
sents a direct form of protection for the regulator or the insurer. The
larger the net worth, the more the value of bank assets can decline before
a shortfall is created that will require the bank's insurer to cover the
bank's deposit liabilities. Consequently, the insurer and regulator will
desire that a bank have a large net worth because it provides direct
protection.
Net worth also provides indirect protection because the larger the
amount of net worth, the larger the owners' stake in the enterprise and
thus the more they have to lose if things go sour. Therefore, owners will
be less likely to undertake risk and more likely to exercise care in the
operation of the company.
From the insurer's point of view, net worth is similar to a deductible in
a home owner's or car owner's policy. The larger the deductible, the
larger the direct protection for the insurer, because the loss on the home
or car has to be greater before the insurer's obligation begins. With a
larger deductible, the home owner or car owner is also likely to be more
careful because he or she is going to be responsible for more of the initial
costs.
Because net worth is so important, one would presume that the regula-
tor or insurer would want to measure it as accurately as possible. Unfor-
tunately, this presumption is incorrect. The standard accounting system
used today is not a market-value oriented system. Today's system calcu-
lates a backward-looking cost, based on an historical accounting system.
It is used for all enterprises in our economy except for investment bank-
ing firms and pension funds, which operate on a market-value basis.
Everybody else, including the bank and thrift world, operates on Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"), which is a backward-
looking, historical system that is slow to recognize market value. Need-
less to say, I am not an enthusiast of GAAP.
Once a bank or S&L has a shortfall in the value of its assets as com-
pared to the value of its insured liabilities, unless the federal government
is prepared to tell the depositors in insured banks and S&Ls, "No, we
lied to you, you're not going to get back your full money, you're not
going to get back a hundred cents on a dollar," unless we're prepared to
do that, this shortfall, the thirty-two dollars from our example, must be
reimbursed to depositors.
In the S&L cleanup that is constantly in the newspapers, the cost of
which runs into the hundreds of billions of dollars, what we are talking
about is an accumulation of the scenario depicted in Figure 3. Notice
that I have not used the word "bailout," because in this context that
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word is a complete misnomer. It implies that bad guys are getting a
windfall. In reality, however, the money is going to pay off insured de-
posits, a direct payout of ninety-two dollars to the depositors. The sixty
dollars in assets are liquidated. We hope and pray that we get the full
sixty dollars back; but even then, we're out thirty-two dollars.
The money may also be used to pay an acquirer, perhaps the bank
across the street or perhaps somebody who has never been in the banking
business before. In the latter case, this person comes along and the fed-
eral government asks, "Are you interested in taking this enterprise
over?" The acquirer says, "Yes I am, I'll be happy to take it over and
operate. But on day one you've given me an operation that has ninety-
two dollars in liabilities and only given me sixty dollars in assets. You're
going to have to give me something to balance out the liabilities with
assets. I will need roughly thirty-two dollars in assets-cash, real estate,
promises, something so that I've got ninety-two dollars in assets to bal-
ance the ninety-two dollars in liabilities."
Consequently, the thirty-two dollar payment will either directly satisfy
the obligations of depositors, or indirectly satisfy these obligations by
finding somebody else to take on the obligations of the depositors. But
the shortfall in assets must be rectified, or nobody is going to take on the
obligation.
I keep asking anybody who uses the "B" word, 'Where is the
bailout?" Depositors have an insurance contract with the Federal Gov-
ernent. The Federal Government promised that their money was in-
sured up to $100,000. If your house burns down and the insurance
company comes around the next day and gives you a check to pay for
your losses, has the insurance company bailed you out? No. It has made
good on its insurance contract with you. Approximately one to two per-
cent of the deposits in an insolvent S&L are above $100,000. Sometimes
these depositors are left unprotected and told, "Your money was unin-
sured, you have to line up with anybody else who's a creditor and maybe
you'll get thirty, forty, sixty cents on the dollar." Sometimes they are
made whole because it is the easiest, lowest cost arrangement to transfer
all of the depositors into the hands of an acquirer. In any event, there are
only a few such uninsured depositors.
Who else might be the beneficiary of something called a bailout? The
previous owners are out of the picture the minute the S&L is either liqui-
dated or turned over to an acquirer. They do not see a cent. In fact, a
recent Fortune Magazine story points out that they are being indicted
and sued wherever there seems to be either criminal or civil liability.
Now it is clear, as we will see from the story, that the owners were
allowed to operate those S&Ls for far too long. Many of them enjoyed a
high style of living for far too long, and once again we wish we could go
back into history and undo that. But when it comes time to dispose of
these insolvent S&Ls, not a cent is going in their direction; it is virtually
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all going to insured depositors either directly or indirectly. That is why I
do not use the "B" word.
Now let me tell you the horrible story. The S&L industry was put
back on its feet in the 1930s as part of the general reform of the financial
system following the debacle of the 1929 to 1933 period. For the first
time we had federal deposit insurance, in 1933 for commercial banks and
a year later for S&Ls. For the first time we had federal regulation and
federal chartering of the S&Ls under the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, which also provided the deposit insurance in these S&Ls through
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"). S&Ls
were seen to be a crucial part of the residential finance system because
they were to be the major providers of home mortgages. And during the
1940s, 1950s and 1960s, as the American economy and its residential
sectors grew and prospered, home values generally grew and with that,
S&Ls prospered. The industry was composed largely of small town
S&Ls based on mutual ownership rather than stock ownership. Many of
their operators acted as if they had a calling because they were promot-
ing thrift and encouraging home ownership. How could there be a
higher purpose in life? Many of them thought of themselves in just the
same way that Jimmy Stewart portrayed George Bailey in the 1946
Frank Capra film It's A Wonderful Life.
The S&L industry was secure because home mortgages were basically
a safe investment. Almost everyone paid back their mortgages. Even if
they did default, in a era of rising property values, the S&L could sell the
property and still avoid a loss. Consequently, the S&Ls were solid insti-
tutions because they had safe assets and because a safety and soundness
regulatory system was in place.
There was a serious flaw in this system, however. These financial insti-
tutions were borrowing short and lending long. Their deposits were
short-term deposits. They were basically pass-book deposits from which
depositors could withdraw on very short notice. Their loans were long-
term, typically thirty years at a fixed rate of interest.
As long as interest rates remained stable, declined, or only increased
gradually, the system worked. During the 1950s and 1960s, this was fre-
quently described as the industry of three-six-three. They were taking in
deposits at three percent, they were lending the money out at six percent,
and they, executives of the local S&Ls, could be expected to be seen on
the golf course by three in the afternoon. If interest rates went up
sharply, however, these institutions would be in deep financial difficulty.
The S&Ls' income potential declined because they made long-term
mortgages at the fixed interest rates that were now relatively low because
interest rates had just risen. To keep the deposits in the institution, S&Ls
were going to have to raise the rates that they paid to their depositors.
This would result in a cost squeeze. They would run losses because their
income from these fixed rate loans of earlier years would be inadequate to
cover the current interest costs to keep the depositors in the institution.
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This problem first arose in 1965 and 1966 when the United States sig-
nificantly increased its involvement in the Vietnam War. Prices and in-
flation started rising and interest rates increased sharply. When the S&L
industry went to Congress for help, Congress responded. Legislation was
passed that extended to S&Ls interest-rate ceilings on the rates of interest
that could be paid on deposits in S&Ls. These "Regulation Q" ceilings
had previously applied only to commercial banks.
The ceilings worked for a little more than ten years because depositors
had very few good alternatives. Basically the only place that a depositor
could go to in the late 1960s and the early 1970s to get another reason-
ably safe, reasonably liquid instrument was to another S&L or commer-
cial bank. And all of them were subject to the same Regulation Q
ceilings.
In 1970, to trap depositors into keeping their money in S&Ls, the
United States Treasury raised the minimum denomination of a Treasury
bill from one thousand dollars to ten thousand dollars. In that year the
average deposit in a S&L was $3,045. Thus, one thousand dollars was
well within the means of the average depositor. But ten thousand dollars
was not.
During the 1970s, however, a number of academic and Congressional
studies predicted that the current system eventually would fail if no
changes were made. Calling for deregulation, these studies stated that a
narrow focus on residential mortgages was not the correct long-term so-
lution for these institutions. They suggested that the government allow
them to diversify their portfolios and make other kinds of loans. The
studies also suggested that the S&Ls get away from fixed-rate mortgages
and make adjustable-rate mortgages.
Study after study concluded that the Regulation Q ceilings were ill-
conceived. They hurt depositors and led to non-price competition. Any-
body reading the New York Times a decade ago remembers that there
were pages of advertisements by the local commercial banks and local
S&Ls offering potential customers prizes if they deposited one thousand
dollars, five thousand dollars, or ten thousand dollars into their banks.
They offered potential customers tennis rackets, toasters, trees planted in
their name in Israel, anything to bring in their money. Because of Regu-
lation Q, they could not pay them a market rate of interest, so they gave
them a toaster instead.
While study after study concluded that changes had to be made, noth-
ing happened. Neither the Congress nor the presidents were interested in
making any changes during those years.
There is a little-known story that in 1973 and again in 1975 and 1976,
my predecessors at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board started develop-
ing regulations that would have allowed federally chartered S&Ls to
make adjustable-rate mortgages: This would have served as an impor-
tant example for the rest of the country. At that time only a few states,
such as California and Wisconsin, allowed their state-chartered S&Ls to
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make adjustable-rate mortgages. The rest of the state-chartered institu-
tions, and all of those federally-chartered, could not make adjustable-rate
mortgages. They could only make fixed rate mortgages.
Each time the Congress, and especially the Congressional banking
committees, said "don't you dare," and my predecessors at the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board backed down. The Congress viewed it as a con-
sumer issue. Many consumer advocates were afraid that S&Ls and
banks would act arbitrarily and summarily raise the interest rates on ad-
justable-rate mortgages. They did not believe that there could be ade-
quate regulation. Consequently, the S&L industry went into the late
1970s locked into a narrow portfolio of long-term, fixed-rate mortgages
and short-term deposits.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s interest rates went up again; inflation
increased and interest rates shot skyward into double digits. This time
Regulation Q was not the solution for the S&Ls' problems because a new
investment alternative appeared on the financial horizon: money market
mutual funds. Money-market mutual funds began in 1972 and grew
slowly during the mid 1970s. Between 1978 and 1982, however, money
market mutual funds grew from less than ten billion dollars to over $200
billion.
Money market mutual funds were a real alternative for depositors be-
cause they offered them a relatively liquid and safe instrument. They
were investing the collected monies given to them by depositors either in
short-term Treasury bills, short-term large denomination bank certifi-
cates of deposit, high-quality commercial paper, or other very safe
instruments.
Now the S&Ls were back in the original dilemma, and Regulation Q
was not available to help them. They were hemorrhaging money. It
started in late 1979, and by 1981 and 1982 the S&L industry had massive
losses. They went back to Congress and again asked for help. Congress
agreed and looked toward deregulation.
In early 1980, Congress passed a major deregulation bill called the
Depository Institution Deregulation Monetary Control Act
("DIDMCA"), which President Carter signed. Toward the end of 1982,
Congress passed another major deregulation bill, the Garn-St Germain
Act, which President Reagan signed.
The deregulation that passed was what an economist would call eco-
nomic deregulation. First, it at last allowed the S&Ls to make adjusta-
ble-rate mortgages. It also allowed them to diversify their portfolios by
making other kinds of consumer loans. They could now make car loans,
boat loans, credit card loans and other kinds of real estate loans, such as
commercial real estate loans. The deregulation allowed the S&Ls to
make commercial loans that did not have any mortgage collateral as well
as out-and-out commercial loans, the way commercial banks made com-
mercial loans. At the federal level, it even allowed thrifts to take direct
ownership positions in small quantities in enterprises and undertakings.
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At the state level, states such as Florida, California, Texas, Arizona,
Louisiana, Arkansas and Colorado were even more liberal in the deregu-
lation on the asset side of their state-chartered but federally insured
S&Ls. For example, California had an "anything-goes" policy permit-
ting investment in just about anything.
Deregulation also removed the Regulation Q interest rate ceilings.
Consequently, both the S&Ls and the commercial banks were no longer
limited in the interest rates that they could pay to their depositors. (The
only place where the Regulation Q ceilings remain is on commercial
checking accounts.) Another effect of the deregulation scheme was the
raising of the amount of federal insurance on an individual deposit from
forty thousand dollars to $100,000.
The intent and effect of deregulation was basically to deregulate on the
asset side, deregulate on the liability side, and increase the amount of
insurance on deposits. These were basically sensible measures to take,
ones that many studies and commissions had been recommending for the
previous decade.
While these changes may have been the correct steps to take, they
came too late. I must emphasize that these changes should have been
accompanied by a drastically stepped-up effort in safety-and-soundness
regulation. To see why, I will take you back to the accounting frame-
work. Remember that in this limited liability world the owners and op-
erators of the S&Ls always have a tendency to take risks. The
deregulation gave them new opportunities to take risks. They were no
longer limited to the narrow, safe world of the home mortgage. They
could now invest new kinds of assets. If they had done it prudently, it
would have given them the opportunity to diversify their portfolio, which
was the sensible thing to do. But because it was done imprudently, it
gave them the opportunity to play roulette with other people's money.
Second, deregulation increased the capability for funding the increased
opportunities because S&Ls could now pay market rates of interest.
Thus, any small S&L could put an advertisement in the Wall Street Jour-
nal reading, "I am the XYZ Savings and Loan of Waco, Texas. You
have never heard of me, but I pay market rates of interest. Send your
deposits to me, they are federally insured."
That same thrift could also ask a deposit broker, many of them first
quality Wall Street investment houses, to gather up the deposits for it
and send them to Waco. Because the insured deposit amount had been
increased from forty thousand dollars to one hundred thousand dollars,
all of these transactions could now be done in larger chunks. To use an
economist's term, the "transaction costs" of gathering up these deposits
had decreased. Thus, by allowing thrifts to pay market rates of interest
and by increasing the insured amount, the capability for funding the in-
creased opportunities for risk-taking had also increased.
Finally, the most important aspect of deregulation was that the incen-
tives for risk-taking had gone up. Because all the thrifts had been run-
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ning losses during 1980, 1981 and 1982, their net worths were effectively
gone. With the owners' stake gone, there was no incentive for them to
avoid risks. That is why we desperately needed a stepped-up safety-and-
soundness system at the time.
In retrospect, it is a miracle that of the over three thousand S&Ls at
the time, only several hundred abused their opportunities. It is a miracle
that the rest of the industry did not do it as well.
Although we needed a stepped-up safety and soundness system, we got
exactly the opposite. During the early 1980s, the safety-and-soundness
system was weakened. First, in response to a clear signal from Congress,
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board lowered the net worth requirement
in 1980 and again in 1982. Thus, at the same time that the risk opportu-
nities went up, the deductibles decreased.
Second, again partially in response to a clear directive from Congress,
the already inadequate accounting system was altered. The only way to
describe it is that S&Ls were allowed to create false assets, ones that had
no real value. The only purpose of this plan was to allow S&Ls to show
increased assets and increased net worths.
Third, the whole safety-and-soundness structure was weakened by a
reduction in the number of field-force examiners and supervisors between
1981 and 1984. These men and women were supposed to be looking over
the shoulders of the S&Ls, doing audits and ensuring that S&Ls operated
in a safe and sound manner. This was the era of deregulation in Wash-
ington, and there were too many people there who did not understand
the distinction between economic deregulation, which was mostly (if not
entirely) sensible, and safety-and-soundness regulation, which needed to
be stepped up.
They appeared to understand it in the airline area. They understood
that we could have economic deregulation by getting rid of the Civil Avi-
ation Board, but that we needed to keep safety regulation in place, thus
keeping the Federal Aviation Administration intact. But when it came
to banking, and S&Ls, that same connection was not made.
Consequently, several hundred S&Ls took advantage of the lax super-
vision. They had the incentives, and they grew very rapidly. Most of
their growth was in non-mortgage, non-residential mortgage assets.
What was clearly going to be a problem was exacerbated by new guys
coming into the industry. It was no longer Jimmy Stewart running the
local S&L. All too often the president of the local S&L looked like War-
ren Beatty in Bonnie and Clyde. New guys had new ways of doing
things.
There were also two external things making it a whole lot worse. One
was the pattern of the price of oil. In the spring of 1981, oil hit a peak of
around thirty-four or thirty-five dollars a barrel. There were a lot of
people in Texas, and even people outside of Texas, who felt that there
would be future oil shortages and oil would go to forty, fifty, eighty or
maybe even one hundred dollars a barrel. Consequently, many real es-
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tate deals took place in Texas and in the energy areas on the expectation
that oil would reach forty and fifty or even eighty dollars a barrel. S&Ls
were either the lenders or investors in these real estate transactions.
The price of oil did not go to fifty or eighty dollars a barrel. It started
slipping in the early 1980s, and then plummeted in 1986. Rather than
going to eighty dollars a barrel, it briefly hit eight dollars a barrel, before
settling at around eighteen dollars a barrel.
At eighteen dollars a barrel for oil, many of those real estate projects
were no longer attractive at all and, in fact, became big money losers.
This meant that the S&Ls that had invested in, or lent to, these projects
were going to lose money on those transactions.
The second change involved taxes. The Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981 made real estate a very tax-favored investment. Depreciation
periods were shortened so that one could get a lot of cash out of a real
estate investment without paying any taxes on it.
Congress changed course with the 1986 Tax Act, however. For our
purposes, the 1986 Tax Act did two things. First, it lengthened those
depreciation periods. Second, it limited the ability of investors to shelter
income earned in non-real estate investments with the paper losses that
they might have incurred on real estate projects. Not only did they limit
that sheltering capability, but they also applied the provision retroac-
tively to existing real estate projects. Once again, this completely
changed the economics of many investment projects, many of which
failed. And again the S&L lenders took heavy losses.
My predecessors at the Federal Home Loan Bank Board started realiz-
ing that something was going wrong in 1984. Over the next three years
they tightened up the regulatory system. They put limits on growth,
raised the net worth standards, improved the accounting system, limited
direct investments, and more than doubled the number of examiners and
supervisors out in the field.
These changes were all vitally necessary to ensure that more damage
was not done. But unfortunately these changes were three years too late.
Between early 1983 and the middle of 1986, virtually all of the damage
that we now read about was done. That was when the bad loans were
made. That was when the bad investments were made. That was when
those assets were put on the books. They were initially valued at one
hundred dollars but today are worth only sixty dollars. The damage
could not be undone at that point because the loans and investments
were already made. We simply did not know at that time how bad they
were.
Part of the fault lies with the accountants, who were slow to examine
those transactions closely. Additionally, the real estate markets of the
Southwest were only starting to crumble in 1985. They have continued
to crumble since then, and as recently as the first or second quarter of
1990, those prices were still declining. Since early 1989, the real estate
decline has spread to other parts of the country as well. Any time there
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is a decline in the price of real estate, the values of assets held by the
S&Ls go down. And that means that the shortfall between the assets and
liabilities increases.
We are only now fully realizing the extent of the damage done between
1983 and 1986. During the period between 1986 and the end of 1988, my
predecessors at the Bank Board, and then I, disposed of well over three
hundred of these insolvent S&Ls. We liquidated some of them but found
acquirers for most of them. In each instance we had to come up with the
equivalent of negative thirty-two dollars either directly in the payouts to
the depositors or indirectly when we found the acquirers. Those transac-
tions generated a great deal of controversy because they have been mis-
understood, and also because the acquirers were some rather
controversial figures: for example, William Simon, Ronald Pearlman
and Robert Bass. In each case, an individual took over an insolvent S&L
that did not have enough assets to cover the liabilities, and the deposit
insurer, the government, had to come up with the shortfall. Sometimes
the payment was made in a single payment. Sometimes the payments
were stretched out over ten years, but the shortfall had been made good.
Legislation was subsequently introduced that included a complete
change in the bureaucratic landscape. My agency was abolished and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") took over our opera-
tions. Fifty billion dollars in funding to handle the "negative thirty-
twos" was to be found partly through Treasury bonds and partly through
off-budget borrowing arrangements. S&Ls were expected to meet higher
net worth standards, and there were some other regulatory reforms in the
package. We now know that fifty billion dollars is not enough and that
the next Congress is going to have to re-address the question not only of
funding but also of deposit-insurance reform.
Before I leave you with what I think are the important reforms, I
would like to address two questions that come up over and over again.
The first question is where the money went. Most people who ask the
question think it must be in a safe deposit box somewhere in Zurich. If
only we could find the key, Secretary of the Treasury Brady could take
the next plane to Zurich, open the box and find all the shortfall money.
Unfortunately, the money is not in a safe deposit box in Zurich. It is
gone. Suppose that you had taken your ninety-two dollars to a friend,
instead of to a S&L. That friend promised that he had a great investment
opportunity for you in a shopping center across the river in New Jersey.
You invest in this "sure thing" and the shopping center is built. Because
it turns out to be the wrong location, the shops do not do very well.
Instead of being worth ninety-two or a hundred or a hundred and ten
dollars, that shopping center today is worth only sixty dollars. Where
did the money go? It went to the brick layers who laid the bricks, to the
John Mansville Company that provided the drywall, to the electrical




In essence, that is where the money in these S&Ls went. They were
bad investments made at a value of one hundred dollars but are worth
only sixty dollars today. The money has been dissipated in bad invest-
ments. There may be small amounts scattered around. To that extent
the charlatans, the frauds and those who violated their fiduciary obliga-
tions can and should be sued-we should try to get every cent we possi-
bly can. But we are not going to get back an appreciable amount-it is
simply not there.
The second question is why the taxpayers should pick up all of this
shortfall. The answer is that it is our Government that made the insur-
ance promise to depositors and then fell asleep at the switch. Besides,
there is no one else. There is only one place that money can come from:
that is our Government and, ultimately, the taxpayers. I cannot imagine
a worse recipe for financial disaster than to tell depositors that their Fed-
eral Government lied to them about deposit insurance. There is truly no
choice but to come up with the money and honor these insurance
obligations.
The sooner we can dispose of these insolvent S&Ls, the smaller the
cost is going to be. But we also need to think about fundamental reform
of our entire deposit-insurance system. The United States Treasury is
supposed to report on this topic either in December 1990 or January
1991. It will be hotly debated in Congress.
I think there are six important aspects of that reform. First, and most
important, we must change our accounting system to market-value ac-
counting. Imagine running a deposit-insurance system without knowing
the market value of the assets and liabilities of the institutions you were
insuring. All you receive are historical reports that tell you what this
loan was worth four years ago when it was made rather than what it is
worth today. You would not want to run a system like that. Nobody in
Washington should want to do so.
Second, we need better net-worth standards. They must be risk-ori-
ented so that somebody that has larger risks in his portfolio must come
up with more net worth, a bigger deductible that will result in greater
protection for the insurer. And the net worth requirement must be based
on a market-value calculation of net worth.
Third, we need to have risk-oriented premiums. We currently have a
system of flat-rate premiums that are paid by banks and S&Ls. Whether
the safest bank or the riskiest bank is involved, they pay the same pre-
mium. No private insurer would charge flat-rate premiums to its in-
sureds. It knows it has to charge higher premiums for the riskier ones
and lower premiums to the safer ones. The same is true for our deposit-
insurance system. If nothing else we should charge lower premiums to
the banks or thrifts that choose to operate with higher net-worth levels
because higher net-worth levels provide more protection for the insurer.
Remember, net worth is like a deductible. Every automobile insurance
company in the land will lower your auto insurance if you choose a
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larger deductible. The same should be true of our deposit-insurance
system.
Fourth, we need to give the bank and S&L regulators stronger powers
so they can intervene early. They should not have to wait for a S&L
virtually to collapse before being able to put that S&L under very tight
restrictions or take it over.
Fifth, we must understand that if we are going to have the Govern-
ment run the deposit-insurance system, we have to have the Treasury as
an automatic backup for the deposit-insurance company. Depositors
should never have to worry about whether the Government is going to
make good on their deposit-insurance policy. There should be an auto-
matic Treasury backup.
This doesn't mean that the Congress should not exercise extensive
oversight and supervision of how those clean-up monies are spent and
how the transactions occur. That is absolutely the business of Congress.
But, depositors should never have to worry about whether that deposit
insurance guaranty is going to be there. This means we need to have
something akin to automatic authorization: The Treasury shall make
these payments. That is not true right now for deposit insurance.
Last, we must go through a period of substantial consolidation of our
financial system. Currently, there are 12,500 commercial banks, 2,500
thrift institutions, and 14,000 credit unions in this country. These are
incredibly large numbers. No other country has nearly that number of
financial institutions. Substantial consolidation means breaking down
the barriers to interstate and intrastate ownership and branching estab-
lishment of branches and offices.
This process must be handled very carefully. If it is handled in a reck-
less manner, these institutions will probably fail because they are too
thinly capitalized.
There it is. That is the story. It is a horrible story, and one that we
should stand in awe of. I hope and pray that we can all learn from it and
prevent yet more awful losses from occurring in the future.
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